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Abstract
In this paper a dynamic game is used to compare licensing of a cost re-
duction innovations under lost profits (LP) and unjust enrichment (UE), both
damage rules used by courts in the calculation of damages when a patent has
been infringed.
The innovation, whose property right belongs to a firm (patent holder)
has a positive probability to be declared invalid in a court. The market is
composed by two homogeneous firms that compete in quantities (Cournot).
Licensing by using royalty rates is preferred compared with fixed fees,
it is observable little licensing (just big innovations).
LP is better (almost all cases) than UE for the industry and society. How-
ever in the major of the cases consumers are better off under UE and in the
major of cases LP benefits more to the patent holder.
1 Introduction
One of the most important mechanisms made for to compensate and to award
innovation is the Patent System. In this system there is an authority (i.e. the EPO
in Europe) that gives rights of property on pieces of knowledge to an agent, this
rights are known as patents.
Once a patent is granted, the patent holder has the exclusivity right to exploit
the commercial potential of a innovation through a monopoly, by licensing to
others or under other kind of contracts ( i.e. cross licensing).
Economists have been interested in the incentives for licensing. By thinking
in the case of a inventor that license to a firm, it does because is not able to exploit
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the commercial potential of the innovation. However, licensing between competi-
tors produces ambiguous results, i.e in a Bertrand competition licensing splits the
monopoly profit, however it is expected licensing in markets with high level of
differentiation.
Other topic that has received great interest for economists is the contractual
mechanism of licensing. Licensing contracts can be summarized in the groups :
licensing by a royalty rate, an fixed fee and a combination of both. The common
approach has been game theory. In this approach the patent holder and one or
several players are involved in a game of three stages:
1. at the first stage of the game, the patent holder decides how much to ask for
the licenses and how many licenses he will offer;
2. at the second stage potential licensees decide whether to get the license or
to use the backstop technology 1;
3. finally in the last stage, firms compete in the market2.
The early literature has assume that patents are indisputable property rights-
ironclad property rights. Several authors have compared fixed fees against royalty
rates under different conditions: insider/ outsider inventor and duopolistic/ mo-
nopolistic/ perfect competence. Sen and Tauman [2007] summarize and extend
the early models. They consider a contract where royalties and fixed fees can be
included together, the innovation is a cost reduction one (drastic or non-drastic3)
and a outsider/incumbent inventor. They conclude that:
1. there is full diffusion of the innovation;
2. consumers are better off, firms are worse off and welfare is improved.
3. the optimal license contract includes a positive royalty rate for non-drastic
innovations.
4. outsider innovator license by a fixed fee just if the market is a monopoly
and the innovation is drastic.
1The best technology available without the use of the innovation
2see Kamien and Tauman [2002] and Sen and Tauman [2007] for a survey about licensing
games under ironclad rights
3In the case of a drastic innovation, the industry becomes a monopoly unless licensing is al-
lowed.
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In an ideal world should be expectable that, just the ideas that increase the well
being of the society should be patented. But, in theory to select which ideas are
valuable or which are not valuable, creates some collateral effects. One of them is
the fact that patents could be declared invalid in a court procedure.
Lemley and Shapiro [2005] and others have pointed out that half of all liti-
gated patents are found to be invalid, some of them with considerable commercial
importance. Nowadays economists have changed the concept of patent as the right
to sue others for infringement.
When potential users decide to infringe a patent, the patent holder could en-
force the property rights by using the legal system, in this arena the patent holder
will try to prove infringement and the infringer(s) will try to invalid the patent.
If the patent holder is successful to prove infringement, the court could au-
thorize the a compensation or damage payments and could order other actions in
order to enforce the property rights. Commonly two liability rules are used for to
calculate damage payments: Lost Profits (LP) and Unjust Enrichment (UE) 4.
When the inventor is incumbent in the market, damages could be calculated in
different ways, the most common way to do it is using the LP rule or the UE rule,
both rules are based in a profile scenario. This scenario is the ”no infringement”
scenario.
By comparing with the base scenario, LP compensate the share of profit lost
by the patent holder caused by the infringement and UE transfers the competitor’s
profit excess to the patent holder.
The impacts of this damages have been studied in different contexts as vertical
relationship and horizontal competition.
In the case of vertical relationship Schankerman and Scotchmer [2001] have
analyzed how liability rules protect patents, they conclude that UE protect better
the patent holder than LP in the case of research tools, however in the case of cost
reduction innovations these results are reverse.
Anton and Yao [2007] explore the impacts of the LP rule on competence and
innovation, assuming a linear demand scheme and a non-drastic innovation, they
conclude that infringement is a dominant situation even under the use of different
liability rules. In the other fold Choi [2009] compares different liability rules
assuming a drastic innovation and a more general demand function, he concludes
that LP benefits more to the patent holder.
The objective of this paper is to fill the gap left by the recent literature related
with the licensing and damage rules, I try first to compare LP against UE, secondly
4see Heath et al. for a complete comparison of damage rules between countries.
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I compare fixed fees against royalty rates and its relation with damage rules.
The starting point of my research is the contribution developed by Wang [1998],
where he develops a duopoly model to study licensing under ironclad patents un-
der a Cournot scenario. In this model royalty rate scheme is compared against
fixed fee licensing for drastic and non-drastic innovations. Under this base model
I added the development made by Anton and Yao and Choi (AYC) to include
probabilistic patents in a take or leave it ex-post5 licensing situation.
In a difference of AYC I use a simple linear demand with homogeneous firms
and homogeneous costs, this specification allow me to study drastic and non-
drastic innovations, also I compare the royalty rate scheme against the fixed fee
scheme assuming probabilistic patents.
My results show that surprisingly licensing is not possible under UE and just
big innovation are licensed under the LP rule, for another side it is showed that
licensing using a royalty rate is better than a fixed fee scheme front the point of
view of the patent holder. Finally, comparison analysis shows that LP protect
better the patentee for big innovations and for small ones the patentee is better
protected by UE.
The document is organized as follows. In the section 2 are established the as-
sumptions and description of a licensing game. In the sections 3, 4 and 5 the game
is solved. In section 6 a comparative analysis between LP and UE is executed. In
section 7 the conclusions and important remarks of this work are analyzed. Proofs
of the propositions are showed in the text and lengthy proofs are treated in an ap-
pendix.
2 The Game
The game is a non cooperative game that involves two players: patent holder (firm
1) and a competitor (firm 2), they produce the same good under fixed marginal
costs c, and without loss of generality it is assume that c = 0.
Let p = 1−q1−q2 be the inverse linear demand function that both face, where
is used the subindex 1 for the patent holder and the subindex 2 for the competitor.
The firm 1 has a patented a cost reduction innovation that reduces the marginal
cost in γ, where 0 < γ.
Let pisi (qi, qj) = (1+γ−q1−q2)qi be the profit function associated with the use
of the new cost reduction innovation by the firm i and let piii(qi, qj) = (1−q1−q2)qi
5ex-post innovation or ex-ante trial.
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be the profit function associated with the use of the old technology. Notice that
the profit function for the patent holder is always pis1.
At the very beginning of the game the patent holder decides whether to license
(L′) or not (N ′), if decides licensing offers a fixed fee (F ) or a royalty rate(r), the
offer is a take it or leave it.
In the second stage the competitor decides between three alternatives: 1) ac-
cept the offer of the patent holder when is offered (L); 2) uses the backstop tech-
nology (N or N ′) and 3) Infringe the patent (I or I ′) (see Figure 1below).
In the last stage the firms decide the quantities offered in the market as solution
of a Cournot game. Once the competitor infringes the patent the patent holder
reacts by starting a process in a court, with the objective to enforce its property
rights.
The result of the trial is unknown, but there is a common knowledge probabil-
ity θ ∈ (0, 1) that the patent will be declared valid after the trial, this parameter
also reflects the strength of the patent.
When the patent holder shows the existence of infringement, the court calcu-
late damage payments, for calculations are considered LP and UE. The method
going to be used by the court for calculate damages is common knowledge before
trial.
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Figure 1: Game tree (the royalty rate case)
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Payoffs are characterized through the actions of the competitor, by example
if the patent holder plays N ′ and the competitor plays N , the payoff obtained is
the same that is obtained in the case when, the patent holder plays L′ and asks a
royalty rate r and the competitor playsN ′, where in both situation players choose
the same quantities.
Then by using this consideration the payoffs are:
1. piN1 = pis1(q1, q2) and piN2 = pii2(q1, q2), when competitor plays N the payoff
for the players are.
2. piL1 = pis1(q1, q2) + L(q2) and piL2 = pis2(q1, q2) − L(q2), when competitor
plays L, notice that L is the license’s fee (a fixed fee or a royalty rate).
3. piI1 = pis1(q1, q2) + θD(q1, q2) and piI2 = pis2(q1, q2)− θD(q1, q2), when com-
petitor plays I. D is the damage payment.
The solution criterion for the game described above is the Sub-Game Perfect
Nash Equilibrium (SPNE),that is going to be solved in the next three sections.
3 Competition Stage
Given a defined rule for the calculations of damages (LP or UE), a level of tech-
nology chosen by the incumbent firm (N , I, L) and a licensing policy defined by
the patent holder (to offer or not a license to the competitor using a fixed fee or a
royalty rate), both firms compete by choosing quantities. This section is devoted
to calculate the payoffs under different scenarios as a solution of the Cournot
problem.
When the competitor decides to use the backstop technology (N ), the Nash
Equilibrium (NE) is granted when
(qN1 , q
N
2 ) =
{(
1+2γ
3
, 1−γ
3
)
if 0 < γ < 1(
1+γ
2
, 0
)
if 1 ≤ γ (1)
As was noted by Arrow [1962] big innovations could permit to the patent
holder to reduce the price till levels below the competitive prices, meaning that
just the patent holder can remain in the market, this kind of innovations are called
drastic. In this particular setup an innovation is non-drastic if 0 ≤ γ < 1 and is
defined drastic if γ ≥ 1.
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Payoffs are
piN1 =
{(
1+2γ
3
)2 if 0 < γ < 1(
1+γ
2
)2 if 1 ≤ γ
piN2 =
{(
1−γ
3
)2 if 0 < γ < 1
0 if 1 ≤ γ
(2)
A more complex situation emerges when the competitor infringes the patent
(I), once infringement is played the patent holder will try to enforce the property
rights by suing the incumbent firm. When the patent holder is successful in the
court (gains the trial), it is assumed here that the court will calculate a damage
payment based in the LP or UE rule.
piI1 = (1− q1 − q2 + γ)q1 + θD(q1, q2)
piI2 = (1− q1 − q2 + γ)q2 − θD(q1, q2)
(3)
Then the payoffs are characterized by eq.(3), notice that the first term of the
r.h.s. (1− qi − qj + γ)qi is the profit gained by the sales and the second term are
the damage payments θD(q1, q2).
Basically UE and LP both need a comparison scenario of ”no infringement”,
here piN1 is used as the comparison value when LP is the liability rule used by the
court. Under LP damages are6.
DLP = max
{
piN1 − (1− q1 − q2 + γ)q1, 0
} (4)
When the court uses UE as liability rule, the damage (DUE) is the excess of
profit of the competitor respect to piN2 , then
DUE = max
{
(1− q1 − q2 + γ)q2 − piN2 , 0
} (5)
The NE when damages are calculated by using the LP rule, and when the
incumbent firm decides to infringe the patent deserves a special treatment. Given
the structure of the damage rules quantities affect the level of damages, so then,
the expected damage has effects on the equilibrium quantities.
6Interested readers could see Anton and Yao [2007] for a more detailed analysis for non drastic
innovation and a more general linear demand.
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Lemma 1. The Cournot solution when competitor infringes and court uses LP
rule for calculate damages is,
(qI,LP1 , q
I,LP
2 ) =
{(
1+2γ
3
, 1−γ
3
)
if γ < θ
3−2θ(
1+γ
3−θ , (1− θ)1+γ3−θ
)
if γ ≥ θ
3−2θ
(6)
, it produces
piI,LP1 =


(
1+2γ
3
)2 if 0 < γ < θ
3−2θ
(1− θ) (1+γ
3−θ
)2
+ θ
(
1+2γ
3
)2 if θ
3−2θ ≤ γ < 1
(1− θ) (1+γ
3−θ
)2
+ θ
(
1+γ
2
)2 if γ ≥ 1
piI,LP2 =


(
1+2γ
3
) (
1−γ
3
)
if 0 < γ < θ
3−2θ(
1+γ
3−θ
)2 − θ (1+2γ
3
)2 if θ
3−2θ ≤ γ < 1(
1+γ
3−θ
)2 − θ (1+γ
2
)2 if γ ≥ 1
(7)
When qI,LP2 = qN2 eq. (6), the patent holder gets the same profit that in the
situation of no infringement. However, the competitor stays in a better situation
because enjoys a lower cost and produce the same quantity that should be pro-
duced under no infringement. Anton and Yao [2007] calls this equilibrium Pas-
sive Infringement, because the damage payment does not reflect the effects of the
infringement.
When γ > θ
3−2θ damage payments calculated with the lost profit rule are pos-
itive in equilibrium, then in equilibrium a Active Infringement is present.
Lemma 2. The Cournot solution when competitor infringes and court uses UE as
liability rule is,
(qI,UE1 , q
I,UE
2 ) =
(
(1− θ)1 + γ
3− θ ,
1 + γ
3− θ
)
(8)
Results in the lemmas 1 and 2 cannot be considered trivial, because the best
replies that produces the NEs are non-smooth in both cases. Proofs of this lemmas
are considered in the appendix7.
7Anton and Yao [2007] have been proved the lemma 1 and have claim that the lemma 2 is true,
in the appendix I offer the proof for the lemma 2 and an alternative proof for the lemma 1.
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By using the lemma 2,
piI,UE1 =
{(
1+γ
3−θ
)2 − θ (1−γ
3
)2 if 0 < γ < 1(
1+γ
3−θ
)2 if γ ≥ 1
piI,UE1 =
{
(1− θ) (1+γ
3−θ
)2
+ θ
(
1−γ
3
)2 if 0 < γ < 1
(1− θ) (1+γ
3−θ
)2 if γ ≥ 1
(9)
When the competitor accepts the offer (L) against a given fixed fee (F ) or a
given royalty rate (r), the following NEs are obtained: in the fixed fee case
(
qL,F1 , q
L,F
2
)
=
(
1 + γ
3
,
1 + γ
3
)
(10)
; and for a given royalty rate (r)
(
qL,R1 , q
L,R
2
)
=
(
1 + γ + r
3
,
1 + γ − 2r
3
)
(11)
these results produce the following payoffs: for the fixed fee case
piL,F1 =
(
1+γ
3
)2
+ F
piL,F2 =
(
1+γ
3
)2 − F (12)
; and
piL,R1 =
(
1+γ+r
3
)2
+ r 1+γ−2r
3
piL,R2 =
(
1+γ−2r
3
)2 (13)
for the royalty rate case.
4 Competitor’s Technology Stage
By assuming that the policy offered by the patent holder is known, it means the
kind of contract offered (royalty rate or fixed fee). For to solve the game is nec-
essary to analyze the behavior of the competitor respect to the technology choice,
where the alternatives are:
1. not infringe the patent N (use the backstop technology);
2. infringe the patent I (use the new technology without a permission of the
patent holder);
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3. accept to pay for the use the new technology if a license is offered L.
Lemma 3. If the courts calculates damages using the LP rule or the UE piI2 ≥ piN2 .
Lemma 3 says that the competitor always prefer to infringe instead to use the
backstop technology independently of the liability rule8. Then so, it is necessary to
just compare the competitor’s payoff under licensing piL2 against the payoff under
infringement piI2 .
Let F be a fixed fee F ≥ 0 such that piL,F2 − piI2 = 0, then
F =
(
1 + γ
3
)2
− piI2 (14)
, notice that if F is negative there is no positive fixed fee that makes the li-
censing option as good as infringe for the competitor. In the appendix is proved
that
Lemma 4. FLP ≥ 0 but F UE ≥ 0 just if γ ≥ δ1, where
δ1 =
12− 5θ + θ2 − 2√(3− θ)2(3 + θ)
6− 7θ + θ2
For the case of licensing under a royalty rate, let r be a royalty rate r ≥ 0 that
makes piL,R2 − piI2 = 0, then if exists
r =
1 + γ − 3
√
piI2
2
(15)
From eq. 12 and 13:
1. ∂(piL,F2 − piI2 )/∂F < 0;
2. ∂(piL,R2 − piI2 )/∂r < 0
3. piL,F = piL,R > 0 if F = r = 0
4. piL,F and piL,R are bounded.
8This result is also true under other liability rules as lost royalties and for more general speci-
fications, see AYC.
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then so, it is possible to create a one to one function betweenr and F , in conse-
quence
Lemma 5. F > 0 iff r > 0
by using the lemma 4 and 5, it is establish that
Lemma 6. In the LP case always exist a positive fixed fee F (or royalty rate r)
such that piL,F2 ≥ piI,LP2 (or piL,R2 ≥ piI,LP2 ). However in the UE case the last
statement is true just for γ > δ1.
5 Licensing Stage
In a take it or leave it bargaining, the patent holder will ask for the fixed fee that
makes the competitor indifferent between take the license or to infringe.
From eq. 12 it is observable that the patent holder will choose the greater F
that makes the competitor enjoys the same profit than under infringement, so then
,
F ⋆ = F
In the case of the royalty rate from the eq. 13 it is easy to see that the patent
holder gets the maximum level of fees when r = 1+γ
2
and piL,R2 = 0, because
r ≤ 1+γ
2
, so then, the patent holder will ask
r⋆ = r
as a royalty rate in exchange of a license, summarizing
Lemma 7. When a licensing contract if offered the patent holder will ask for
F ⋆ = F (r⋆ = r) when a fixed fee (royalty rate) is asked against the license.
By using the definition of r (eq. 15) in the payoff function piL,R1 from eq.13,
the patent holder’s payoff is
piL,R1 =
(
1 + γ
2
)2
− 5
4
piI2 (16)
From eq. 14, piI2 =
(
1+γ
3
)2−F ⋆, by replacing piI2 in the last equation produces
piL,R1 =
(
1 + γ
2
)2
− 5
4
[(
1 + γ
3
)2
− F ⋆
]
(17)
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and by using eq. 12, produces
piL,R1 − piL,F1 = F ⋆/4 ≥ 0
, summarizing.
Proposition 1. The patent holder will prefer to license using a royalty rate scheme
instead or a fixed fee scheme.
When the patent holder does not offer a license, the competitor infringes the
patent, so then the patent holder has to compare piL1 against piI1 in order to offer or
not a license. Then by comparing this payoffs is observable that
Proposition 2. The patent holder will never license under UE. However under LP
a royalty rate’s license is offered if γ > δ2, where
δ2 =
θ(3− 2θ) + 3√(3− θ)2(2− θ)
18− 15θ + 4θ2
.
In the last lemma δ2 is near to 1, meaning that just big innovations are licensed
when courts used the LP rule. This result also coincides with the result by Choi
[2009] when he concludes that the royalty rate under UE is lower than the one
under LP in a general demand case.
Here, in fact when UE is use by the court, there is not royalty rate in equilib-
rium, because the royalty rate is not so big for to make the payoff under licensing
enough big as the expected payoff under infringement, for the patent holder.
6 LP vs UE
In this section a comparison between LP and UE is made it using the results of
previous sections.By summarizing,
Lemma 8. When the LP rule is used there are three situations:
1. passive infringement γ ≤ θ/(3− 2θ);
2. active Infringement γ > θ/(3− 2θ);
3. licensing by a royalty rate γ > δ2, where 0 ≤ θ/(3− 2θ) ≤ δ2 ≤ 1.
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However, when UE is used there is no licensing and the competitor infringes the
patent in equilibrium.
Then so, the equilibrium payoffs under both regimes are
(
piLPi , pi
UE
i
)
=


(
piI,LPi , pi
I,UE
i
)
0 ≤ γ < δ2(
piL,R,LPi , pi
I,UE
i
)
γ ≥ δ2
where i = 1, 2, in consequence by using eq. 16 and 7 it is easy to obtain the
equilibrium payoffs under the LP regime
piLP1 =


(
1+2γ
3
)2 if 0 < γ ≤ θ/(3− 2θ)
(1− θ) (1+γ
3−θ
)2
+ θ
(
1+2γ
3
)2 if θ/(3− 2θ) ≤ γ < δ2(
1+γ
2
)2 − 5
4
((
1+γ
3−θ
)2 − θ (1+2γ
3
)2) if δ2 < γ < 1(
1+γ
2
)2 − 5
4
((
1+γ
3−θ
)2 − θ (1+γ
2
)2) if 1 ≤ γ
piLP2 =


(
1+2γ
3
) (
1−γ
3
)
if 0 < γ ≤ θ/(3− 2θ)(
1+γ
3−θ
)2 − θ (1+2γ
3
)2 if θ/(3− 2θ) < γ < 1(
1+γ
3−θ
)2 − θ (1+γ
2
)2 if 1 ≤ γ
(18)
Because in the case of UE infringement is always present, then from eq. 9 the
payoffs are
piUE1 =
{ (
1+γ
3−θ
)2 − θ (1−γ
3
)2 if 0 < γ < 1(
1+γ
3−θ
)2 if 1 ≤ γ
piUE2 =
{
(1− θ) (1+γ
3−θ
)2
+ θ
(
1−γ
3
)2 if 0 < γ < 1
(1− θ) (1+γ
3−θ
)2 if 1 ≤ γ
(19)
and by comparing payoffs under LP against UE, is established that
Proposition 3. The patent holder and the industry (competitor) are better off (is
worse off) under LP (UE) for drastic and almost all the non-drastic innovations.
As is Showed in the Figure 2 the patent holder is better off under LP (gray
area) a mirror situation happens with the competitor that is better off under UE
(black area), both situations are often observed except in a small area.
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Figure 2: LP against UE: LP ≻ UE in gray; LP ≺ UE in black; and LP ≈ UE
in white
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Schankerman and Scotchmer [2005] said that under LP the competitor is worry
about the looses of the patent holder, so then, its output is chosen endogenously
for to compensate the damages of the patent holder, so LP turns in a collusive
mechanism of profit transfer.
When the effect on the industry is compared, industry is better off under UE
in the area on passive infringement (black area), the reason comes from the fact
that under passive infringement there is not transfers from the competitor to the
patent holder under LP, this reduces the possibility to reach a collusive profit for
the industry.
However, when active infringement is present both rules produces the same in-
dustry profit, this result coincides with the one find it by Choi [2009] for a general
quantity competition. Finally, when the innovation is drastic and LP is used there
is licensing, this mechanism seems to be better that the UE damages infringement
mechanism for to share the surplus of the innovation. In a consequence a inverse
situation is going to be observed by the consumers whom are loosing surplus fac-
ing a higher price.(see lemma 4)
When a patent race is considered, the patent holder equilibrium’s payoff is the
reward of the winner and the competitor’s payoff is the reward of the looser in the
patent race, then as consequence of the proposition 3,
Proposition 4. LP incentives more R&D than UE for drastic and almost all non-
drastic innovations.
In the case of the consumers, as consequence that the demand is linear, the
consumer surplus is (q1 + q2)2/2 = Q2/2. Now, when the LP rule is used by
using eq 6, 11 and lemma 8
QLP =


2+γ
3
if 0 < γ < θ/(3− 2θ)
(2− θ)1+γ
3−θ if θ/(3− 2θ) ≤ γ < δ2
2(1+γ)−r
3
if γ ≥ δ2
, now by using eq 7
QLP =


2+γ
3
if 0 < γ < θ/(3− 2θ)
(2− θ)1+γ
3−θ if θ/(3− 2θ) ≤ γ < δ2
(1+γ)
3
+
√(
1+γ
3−θ
)2 − θ (1+2γ
3
)2 if δ2 ≤ γ < 1
(1+γ)
3
+
√(
1+γ
3−θ
)2 − θ (1+γ
2
)2 if γ ≥ 1
(20)
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For UE from eq 8
QUE = (2− θ)1 + γ
3− θ (21)
, so then, by direct comparison between QLP versus QUE , it is establish that
Proposition 5. The consumers are better off under UE for drastic innovations,
but under non-drastic innovations LP is at least as good as UE.
Let SW = Q2/2 +
∑
pii be the social welfare, then by using eq 17,18,19 and
20, comparisons shows that
Proposition 6. Under non-drastic innovations LP is at least as good as UE, for
the society, but for drastic innovations society is better off under the LP (UE) for
strong (weak) patents.
When innovations are drastic and LP is used, there is licensing against a roy-
alty rate. However, when patents are weak (small θ), patentees have less power
of bargain, so then, patentees receive a small royalty rate, it produces a fall in the
revenues of the patent holder and the industry (see Figure 2).
7 Conclusions
Throughout this article LP rule is compared against UE rule, as consequence of
proposition 3, 5 is conclusive that LP should be preferred. At first because has
a positive impact on R&D. In second it is the positive net effect on the society,
even being considered a collusive mechanism.
Damages has been prove to be important in to determine the licensing terms
and critical for the existence of a licensing contract (fixed fee or royalty rate). The
results show that there is no licensing under UE, nevertheless under LP just big
innovations are licensing.
One implicit assumption of this model is the timing, this model lives and ends
during the litigation time, by making so that injunctions have not been important,
then even the results showed here predict no licensing, it could be possible when
injunctions are considered9.
Some questions remain unsolved, the first one is related to the objectives of
damage rules in to deter infringement the question in this direction is: Which new
9see Farrell and Shapiro [2008] and Encaoua and Lefouili [2009] for the study of licensing
when just injunctions are considered.
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damage rule could deter infringement?, also an axiomatic point of view could be
useful in such way could be important to know which ideal properties must be
present in a damage rule.
One of the problems with non-drastic innovations and lost profits are the non-
smooth of the payoff function, more work should be done trying to characterize
some smooth approximation to this functions as was (i.e. Boone [2001]).
Appendix
Proof Lemma 1. It is important to notice is that the best response function φ1(q2) is the
same whether DLP > 0 or DLP = 0. The best response when q2 ∈ [0, a− c + ǫ] is
φ1(q2) =
1− q2 + γ
2
The best response of the competitor deserves a special treatment. Let,
x(q1, q2) = (1− q1 − q2 + γ)q2 − θmax
{
πN1 − (1− q1 − q2 + γ)q1, 0
}
= x1(q1, q2)− θmax{x2(q1, q2), 0}
be the payoff of the competitor.
When q1 > 1 + γ the price becomes negative for any q2 ≥ 0, then in this case
φ2(q1) = 0 if q1 > 1 + γ
.
If the innovation is drastic πN1 is the monopoly profit in consequence πN1 − (1− q1−
q2 + γ)q1 ≥ 0 for any q1, q2 ≥ 0, then DLP > 0 and, in consequence
φ2(q1) =
1 + γ − (1 + θ)q1
2
if γ/(1) ≥ 1 and q1 ∈ [0, 1 + γ)
When the innovation is non drastic, for a given q1 ∈ [0, 1 + γ), x(q1, q2) reach max-
imum at q˜2, where 0 < q˜2 < qˆ2 = (1 + γ − q1)/2 and qˆ2 is the maximum of x1(q1, q2).
Then ∂x1(q1, q2)/∂q2 > 0 for q2 ∈ [0, (1+γ−q1)/2). And ∂x2(q1, 0)/∂q2 = q1 for any
q2. Then the best response depends on the sign of x2(q1, q2), this sign could be positive,
negative or zero. There are two values of q1 that make x2(q1, 0) = 0,
qa,b1 =
(1 + γ)±
√
(1 + γ)2 − 4πN1
2
=
(1 + γ)
2
±
√(
1 + γ
2
)2
−
(
1 + 2γ
3
)2
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, where a refers to the inferior value and b to the superior one. For a given q1 x2(q1, 0)
reach minimum at qc1 =
(1+γ)
2 , this results plus the fact that γ/(1) < 1 allow to see that
0 < qa1 < q
N
1 < q
c
1 < q
b
1 < 1 + γ
.
In consequence x2(q1, 0) > 0 for q1 ∈ (0, qa1) ∪ (qb1, 1 + γ) and x2(0) ≤ 0 when
q1 ∈ [qa1 , qb1], then
φ2(q1) =
1 + γ − (1 + θ)q1
2
if q1 ∈ (0, qa1) ∪ (qb1, 1 + γ) and γ/(1) < 1
.
The next case appears when q1 ∈ [qa1 , qb1], in consequence x2(q1, 0) ≤ 0, then by
looking for some qa2 that makes x2(q1, qa2) = 0
qa2 = (1 + γ)− q1 − πN1 /q1
≥ (1 + γ)− qb1 − πN1 /qa1 = 0
, in consequence 0 ≤ qa2 < 1 + γ. Now by evaluating the derivative on the right of x at
(q1, q
a
2) (or directional derivative in the direction (0, 1)),
∂+x/∂q2(q1, q
a
2) = 1 + γ − 2qa2 − q1 − θq1, then
φ2(q1) = q
a
2 if q1 ∈ [qa1 , qb1] ∧ γ/(1) < 1 ∧ 1 + γ − 2qa2 − q1 − θq1 ≤ 0
or
φ2(q1) =
1 + γ − (1 + θ)q1
2
if q1 ∈ [qa1 , qb1] ∧ γ/(1) < 1 ∧ 1 + γ − 2qa2 − q1 − θq1 > 0
When is assumed that x2 > 0 the Nash equilibrium is(
1+γ
3−θ , (1− θ)1+γ3−θ
)
, now if x2 ≤ 0, qa2(φ1) = qN2 , so then φ1(qN2 ) = qN1 and the condition γ/(1) <
1 ∧ 1 + γ − 2qa2 − q1 − θq1 > 0 becomes in γ/(1) < θ/(3− 2θ), this condition implies
that 1+γ3−θ ∈ [qa1 , qb1], then if γ/(1) < θ/(3− 2θ) holds x2 < 0 in equilibrium and the Nash
equilibrium is
(
1+2γ
3 ,
1−γ
3
)
.
When γ/(1) < θ/(3−2θ) does not hold x2 > 0, the Nash equilibrium is
(
1+γ
3−θ , (1− θ)1+γ3−θ
)
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Proof Lemma 2. There is a symmetry respect to last proof, this time φ2(q1) is the same
whether DUE > 0 or DUE = 0, when q1 ∈ [0, 1 + γ] is
φ2(q1) =
1− q1 + γ
2
and 0 if q1 > 1 + γ.
Let,
y(q1, q2) = (1− q1 − q2 + γ)q1 + θmax
{
(1− q1 − q2 + γ)q2 − πN2 , 0
}
= y1(q1, q2)− θmax{y2(q1, q2), 0}
be the payoff of the patent holder.
When q2 > 1 + γ the price becomes negative for any q1 ≥ 0, then in this case
φ1(q2) = 0 if q2 > 1 + γ
.
If the innovation is drastic πN2 = 0 , then
φ1(q2) =
1 + γ − (1 + θ)q2
2
if γ/(1) ≥ 1 and q2 ∈ [0, 1 + γ)
When the innovation is non drastic, for a given q2 ∈ [0, 1 + γ), y(q1, q2) reach max-
imum at q˜1, where 0 < q˜1 < qˆ1 = (1 + γ − q2)/2 and qˆ1 is the maximum of y1(q1, q2).
Then ∂y1(q1, q2)/∂q1 > 0 for q1 ∈ [0, (1+γ−q2)/2) and ∂y2(q1, 0)/∂q1 = −q2 for any
q1. Then the best response depends on the sign of y2(q1, q2), this sign could be positive,
negative or zero. There are two values of q2 that make y2(0, q2) = 0,
qa,b2 =
(1 + γ)±
√
(1 + γ)2 − 4πN2
2
=
(1 + γ)
2
±
√(
1 + γ
2
)2
−
(
1− γ
3
)2
where a refers to the inferior value and b to the superior one. y2(q1, 0) reach maximum
at qc2 =
(1+γ)
2 , in a consequence
0 < qa2 < q
c
2 < q
b
2 < 1 + γ
.
Also y2(0, q2) < 0 for q1 ∈ (0, qa2)∪ (qb2, 1+γ) and y2(0, q2) ≥ 0 when q2 ∈ [qa2 , qb2],
then
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φ1(q2) =
1 + γ − q2
2
if q2 ∈ [qa1 , qb1]
.
if φ1(q2) = 1+γ3 is played the best response of the other player is
1+γ
3 ∈ [qa2 , qb2], in a
consequence it is not a NE.
Because qb2 > qˆ2, the best response belong to the interval [0, qa2) when y(0, q2) > 0.
There is
qa1 = (1 + γ)− q2 − πN2 /q2
≥ (1 + γ)− qb2 − πN1 /qa2 = 0
that makes y2(qa1 , q2) = 0, where 0 ≤ qa2 < 1 + γ.
then the derivative on the left (or in direction (-1,0)),
∂−y/∂q1(qa1 , q2) = −(1 + γ − 2qa1 − q2 − θq2), then
φ2(q1) = q
a
1 if q2 ∈ [0, qa1) ∧ γ/(1) < 1 ∧ −(1 + γ − 2qa1 − q2 − θq2) ≤ 0
φ2(q1) =
1 + γ − (1 + θ)q1
2
if q2 ∈ [0, qa1) ∧ γ/(1) < 1 ∧ −(1 + γ − 2qa1 − q2 − θq2) > 0
If is assumed that y2 > 0 the Nash equilibrium is(
1+γ
3−θ , (1− θ)1+γ3−θ
)
, now if y2 ≤ 0 in equilibrium, qa2(φ1) = (1 + 5γ)/3, so then φ2((1 + 5γ)/3) = qN2
and the condition −(γ/(1) < 1 ∧ 1 + γ − 2qa2 − q1 − θq1) ≤ 0 becomes in −(1 −
2γ)/3 + (1 + θ)(1− γ)/3 ≤ 0, but the first term is always positive then the unique Nash
equilibrium is
(
1+γ
3−θ , (1− θ)1+γ3−θ
)
Proof Lemma 3. When γ ≤ θ/(3 − 2θ), πI,LP2 =
(
1+2γ
3
)(
1−γ
3
)
>
(
1−γ
3
)2
= πN2 .
When θ/(3− 2θ) ≤ γ < 1,
G(γ, θ) = πI,LP2 − πN2 =
(
1 + γ
3− θ
)2
− θ
(
1 + 2γ
3
)2
−
(
1− γ
3
)2
, now notice that G11 =
(
1
3−θ
)2 − 4θ+19 , because at θ = 0 G11 = 0 and because
dG11/dθ = 2(3 − θ)−3 − 4/9 < (2)−2 − 4/9 < 0, G11 < 0 for θ ∈ (0, 1), then G is
concave in γ for θ ∈ (0, 1).
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G(1, θ) =
(
2
3−θ
)2 − θ, moreover G2(1, θ) = 8(3 − θ)−3 − 1 < 0 for θ ∈ (0, 1),
G(1, 0) =
(
2
3
)2
and G(1, 1) = 0 then by continuity G(1, θ) > 0 for θ ∈ (0, 1).
G(θ/(3− 2θ), θ) =
(
1
3− 2θ
)2
− θ
(
1
3− 2θ
)2
−
(
1− θ
3− 2θ
)2
=
θ(1− θ)
(3− 2θ)2 > 0
because G is concave in γ and G(θ/(3− 2θ), θ), G(1, θ) > 0 G > 0 for γ > θ/(3−
2θ) and θ ∈ (0, 1).
When γ > 1, πI,LP2 ≥ πN2 = 0.
For the UE case, if γ < 1
πI,UE2 = (1− θ)
(
1+γ
3−θ
)2
+ θ
(
1−γ
3
)2
>
(
1−γ
3
)2
= πN2
and in the case γ > 1, πI,UE2 ≥ πN2 = 0
Proof Lemma 4. By using eq 2.14 this definition
FLP =


(
1+γ
3
)2 − (1+2γ3 )(1−γ3 ) if 0 < γ ≤ θ3−2θ(
1+γ
3
)2 − (1+γ3−θ)2 + θ (1+2γ3 )2 if θ3−2θ < γ < 1(
1+γ
3
)2 − (1+γ3−θ)2 + θ (1+γ2 )2 if 1 ≤ γ
(22)
and after some algebra
FLP =


1
9γ(1 + 3γ) if 0 < γ ≤ θ3−2θ
θ(3−5θ+θ2+γ2(30−23θ+4θ2)+γ(24−22θ+4θ2))
9(3−θ)2 if
θ
3−2θ < γ < 1
(1+γ)2θ(57−50θ+9θ2)
36(3−θ) if 1 ≤ γ
it is straightforward to see that the first and third term are positive, in the case of the second
term, this term is not always positive, but if θ3−2θ < γ < 1, the term is also positive, then
FLP ≥ 0.
Now in the case of UE,
FUE =


(
1+γ
3
)2 − (1− θ)(1+γ3−θ)2 − θ (1−γ3 )2 if 0 < γ < 1(
1+γ
3
)2 − (1− θ)(1+γ3−θ)2 if 1 ≤ γ (23)
and after some algebra
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FUE =

 −
θ(6−7θ+θ2+γ2(6−7θ+θ2)−2γ(12−5θ+θ2))
9(−3+θ)2 if 0 < γ < 1
(1+γ)2θ(3+θ)
9(3−θ)2 if 1 ≤ γ
(24)
it is easy to see that the first term in this case is not always positive, however after find
the roots of the polynomial it is easy to see that the expression is equal or greater than
zero when γ > 12−5θ+θ2−2
√
27−9θ−3θ2+θ3
6−7θ+θ2 . In the case of the second term is easy to see
that is positive. Then FUE ≥ 0 if γ > 12−5θ+θ2−2
√
27−9θ−3θ2+θ3
6−7θ+θ2 .
Proof Proposition 2. from 2.14 πL,R1 =
(
1+γ
2
)2 − 54πI2
πL,R,LP1 =


(
1+γ
2
)2 − 54 (1+2γ3−θ )(1−γ3 ) 0 ≤ γ < θ3−2θ(
1+γ
2
)2 − 54
((
1+γ
3−θ
)2 − θ (1+2γ3 )2
)
θ
3−2θ ≤ γ < 1(
1+γ
2
)2 − 54
((
1+γ
3−θ
)2 − θ (1+γ2 )2
)
γ ≥ 1
then after some algebra
πL,R,LP1 − πI,LP1 =


− (1−γ)(5θ+γ(9+7θ))36(3−θ) 0 ≤ γ < θ3−2θ
θ(−9+3θ+θ2+2γθ(−3+2θ)+γ2(18−15θ+4θ2))
36(−3+θ)2
θ
3−2θ ≤ γ < 1
(1+γ)2(1−θ)2θ
16(3−θ)2 γ ≥ 1
it is easy to see that the first term is negative, the third one is positive and the second
one could be positive or negative this case is not always positive, however after find the
roots of the polynomial this expression is equal or greater than zero when γ >. In the
case of the second term is easy to see that is positive. Then πL,R,LP1 − πI,LP1 ≥ 0 if
γ >
θ(3−2θ)+3
√
(3−θ)2(2−θ)
18−15θ+4θ2 .
For the case of UE by preceding as in the LP case,
πL,R,UE1 =


(
1+γ
2
)2 − 54 ∗
(
(1− θ)
(
1+γ
3−θ
)2
+ θ ∗
(
1−γ
3
)2)
0 ≤ γ < 1(
1+γ
2
)2 − 54 ∗
(
(1− θ)
(
1+γ
3−θ
)2)
γ ≥ 1
then after some algebra and using the definition of πI,UE1
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πL,R,UE1 − πI,UE1 =

−
θ(18−15θ+θ2−2γθ(3+θ)+γ2(18−15θ+θ2))
36(−3+θ)2 0 ≤ γ < 1
(1+γ)2(−1+θ)θ
4(−3+θ)2 γ ≥ 1
The second term is clearly negative, in the case of the roots of the polynomial are
imaginary then the term is positive or negative, because at θ = γ = 1/2 the value is
−187/7200, then πL,R,UE1 − πI,UE1 < 0.
Proof Proposition 3. After some algebra,
πLP1 − πUE1 =


θ(3−5θ+θ2)−2γ(−9+21θ−8θ2+θ3)+γ2(27−15θ−2θ2+θ3)
9(−3+θ)2 0 ≤ γ < θ3−2∗θ
θ(9−12θ+2γ(−6+θ)θ+2θ2+γ2(36−30θ+5θ2))
9(−3+θ)2
θ
3−2∗θ ≤ γ < δ2
θ(2γθ(−9+2θ)+3(3−5θ+θ2)+γ2(54−45θ+8θ2))
12(−3+θ)2 δ2 ≤ γ < 1
(1+γ)2θ(21−26θ+5θ2)
16(−3+θ)2 γ ≥ 1
It easy to see that the third and fourth cases are positive, the second case has two
roots under θ/(2 − theta) and because at θ = γ = 1/2 is positive the term is also
positive in the region under study, the last case has both roots inside the study region,
then after a straightforward analysis it is concluded that. πLP1 − πUE1 > 0 if θ <
−9+21θ−8θ2+θ3±3√9−51θ+85θ2−50θ3+12θ4−θ5
27−15θ−2θ2+θ3 .
In the case of the competitor, after some algebra
πLP2 − πUE2 =


− θ(6−7θ+θ
2)+γ(9−30θ+11θ2−2θ3)+γ2(27−12θ−4θ2+θ3)
9(−3+θ)2 0 ≤ γ < θ3−2∗θ
− θ(9−12θ+2γ(−6+θ)θ+2θ
2+γ2(36−30θ+5θ2))
9(−3+θ)2
θ
3−2∗θ ≤ γ < 1
− (1+γ)2(−6+θ)θ2
9(−3+θ)2 γ ≥ 1
in the last case is easy to see that the expression is positive, in the second case both roots
are under θ/(3 − 2θ) and the expression is negative at θ = γ = 1/2, finally in the first
case both roots are inside the region of interest then after some analysis is straightforward
to see that πLP1 − πUE1 > 0 if θ > −9+30θ−11θ
2+2θ3−3√9−132θ+238θ2−116θ3+17θ4
2(27−12θ−4θ2+θ3) .
In the case of the industry
∑
πLPi −
∑
πUEi =


θ(−3+2θ)+γ2θ(−3+2θ)+γ(9−12θ+5θ2)
9(−3+θ)2 0 ≤ γ < θ3−2∗θ
0 θ3−2∗θ ≤ γ < δ2
θ(−9+3θ+θ2+2γθ(−3+2θ)+γ2(18−15θ+4θ2))
36(−3+θ)2 δ2 ≤ γ < 1
(1+γ)2θ(189−138θ+29θ2)
144(−3+θ)2 γ ≥ 1
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In the first case both roots are outside the region of study and at θ = 1/2, γ = 1/10 the
expression is negative, then
∑
πLPi −
∑
πUEi < 0 if 0 ≤ γ < θ3−2∗θ , the third case follows
by notice that one of the roots is δ2 (the other one is negative) and at θ = 1/10, γ = 9/10
the expression is positive, then
∑
πLPi −
∑
πUEi > 0 if θ3−2∗θ ≤ γ < δ2, and the last
case follows directly.
Proof Proposition 4. after some algebra
QLP −QUE =


θ−γ(3−2θ)
3(3−θ) 0 ≤ γ < θ3−2∗θ
0 θ3−2∗θ ≤ γ < δ2
− (1+γ)(−3+2θ)3(−3+θ) +
√(
1+γ
3−θ
)2 − θ ∗ (1+2∗γ3 )2 δ2 ≤ γ < 1
− (1+γ)(−3+2θ)3(−3+θ) +
√(
1+γ
3−θ
)2 − θ ∗ (1+γ2 )2 γ ≥ 1
in the case when 0 ≤ γ < θ3−2∗θ , it is observable that ∂(QLP −QUE)/∂γ < 0 and at
γ = θ3−2∗θ Q
LP −QUE = 0, then QLP −QUE > 0 for 0 ≤ γ < θ3−2∗θ . In the third case,
because both roots of the polynomial are below δ2 then the term is positive or negative,
because at θ = 1/10, γ = 9/10 the expression is negative, by noticing that if the third
term is negative this implies that the fourth it is also negative, then QLP − QUE > 0 for
γ ≥ δ2.
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